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TWO TIERS OF PLAINTIFFS: HOW NORTH 
CAROLINA’S TORT REFORM EFFORTS 
DISCRIMINATE AGAINST LOW-INCOME 
PLAINTIFFS* 
“We are saying to doctors and hospitals it’s OK to kill somebody 
who comes from a poor family because ultimately they aren’t 
going to have the same effect on our medical-malpractice 
insurance as somebody who comes from a rich family.”1 
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 1. Rachel Zimmerman & Joseph T. Hallinan, As Malpractice Caps Spread, Lawyers 
Turn Away Some Cases, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2004), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB109717758841639476 [https://perma.cc/UDB9-6YM6 (staff uploaded archive)].  
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INTRODUCTION 
In its most general form, “[t]ort reform . . . refers to legislative 
proposals or enactments that modify the common law rules of torts.”2 
However, in recent years, tort reform has taken on a more politically 
charged meaning, manifesting itself through “legislation to limit, or 
‘cap,’ damages awarded to plaintiffs in malpractice cases.”3 Tort 
reform has been a controversial topic for decades, particularly within 
the context of medical malpractice litigation.4 Proponents of tort 
reform point to an increase in frivolous lawsuits, runaway jury 
verdicts, malpractice insurance premiums, and healthcare costs.5 
Furthermore, proponents cite an uptick in the practice of defensive 
medicine, which occurs when doctors recommend unnecessary 
medical tests and procedures to minimize the risk of malpractice 
litigation.6 Such proponents have described tort reform as “passing 
laws to deter outrageous jury verdicts and windfall recoveries to 
undeserving parties.”7 Conversely, critics argue that these concerns 
are not as drastic as proponents claim and instead focus on the impact 
that tort reform has on plaintiffs’ abilities to bring legitimate 
lawsuits.8 Regardless of which side is “right” about tort reform, the 
clear trend has been for states to pass laws making it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to obtain large jury awards in medical malpractice and 
 
 2. Julie Davies,	Reforming the Tort Reform Agenda, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 119, 
120 n.3 (2007).  
 3. Carly N. Kelly & Michelle M. Mello,	Are Medical Malpractice Damages Caps 
Constitutional? An Overview of State Litigation, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 515, 515 (2005); 
see also Roland Christensen, Comment, Behind the Curtain of Tort Reform, 2016 BYU L. 
Rev. 261, 264 (2016) (describing tort reform as a “political agenda developed in response 
to perceived problems with the current tort system”).  
 4. See Burton Craige, The Brave New World of Malpractice Litigation, N.C. ST. B. J., 
Spring 2012, at 16,	16–17 (describing how the damages cap has generated “intense 
debate”); Theodore R. LeBlang,	The Medical Malpractice Crisis—Is There A Solution?, 27 
J. LEGAL MED. 1, 9 (2006) (noting “the controversy surrounding 
malpractice	tort	reform	strategies and their effectiveness”); David Donovan, Latest Data 
Show State’s Tort Reform Act Delivered a Knock-Down Blow, N.C. LAWS. WKLY. (July 
24, 2015), http://nclawyersweekly.com/2015/07/24/latest-data-show-that-states-tort-reform-
act-delivered-a-knock-down-blow/ [https://perma.cc/8FFJ-HF56] (“It’s definitely not a 
level playing field. The truth is that they [doctors] have the advantage pretty much every 
step of the way. The crisis in medical malpractice litigation is that too many legitimate 
claims now go uncompensated.”).  
 5. See Burton Craige, The Medical Malpractice “Crisis”: Myth and Reality, N.C. ST. 
B. J., Summer 2004, at 8–9. 
 6. See M. Sonal Sekhar & N. Vyas, Defensive Medicine: A Bane to Healthcare, ANN. 
MED. HEALTH SCI. RES., Apr.–June 2013, at 295, 295–96, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pmc/articles/PMC3728884/ [https://perma.cc/RP3S-KPA8 (dark archive)]. 
 7. Christensen, supra note 3, at 263–64. 
 8. See Craige, supra note 4, at	16–17. 
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personal injury cases.9 This legislation has often taken the form of 
noneconomic damages caps, which statutorily limit the amount of 
money a jury may award a successful plaintiff for subjective damage 
calculations, such as pain and suffering.10 In contrast, economic 
damages include compensation for objectively verifiable monetary 
losses, such as past and future medical expenses and wages.11 
These reforms have resulted in the systematic devaluation of 
certain groups of plaintiffs—namely lower-income plaintiffs—as 
lawyers are forced to consider the likelihood of recovering significant 
economic damages as the barometer for a successful claim.12 When 
noneconomic damages are capped, the chance of a plaintiff receiving 
a large jury verdict is increasingly dependent on the economic 
damages available. Therefore, if two plaintiffs—one a Silicon Valley 
executive and one a stay-at-home mother—present factually identical 
cases, an attorney has far more incentive to represent the executive 
who may be able to receive millions of dollars in lost wages and future 
earnings, as opposed to the unemployed individual who stands to win 
very little in the way of economic damages.13 These facts presented 
themselves in a California medical malpractice claim, resulting in a $2 
million settlement for the executive and a $300,000 settlement for the 
stay-at-home mother.14 
North Carolina joined this national trend when the General 
Assembly passed a series of tort reform bills in June and July of 2011, 
drastically altering the landscape of medical malpractice law in the 
state.15 These reforms collectively comprise a series of procedural, 
 
 9. As of 2016, thirty-three states adhere to some form of statutorily imposed 
damages cap when calculating the amount of damages a jury may award a successful 
plaintiff. Medical Malpractice Damage Caps, MED. MALPRACTICE CTR., 
http://www.malpracticecenter.com/legal/damage-caps [https://perma.cc/2A7P-KTJ5]. 
 10. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	90-21.19 (2015). 
 11. Non-economic Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2015); Ending the 
Confusion: Economic, Non-Economic, and Punitive Damages, AM. COLL. OF SURGEONS, 
https://www.facs.org/advocacy/federal/liability/ending-the-confusion [https://perma.cc/4LTB-
4B6D]. 
 12. See Zimmerman & Hallinan, supra note 1 (“The American Medical Association, a 
supporter of tort reform, acknowledges that some plaintiffs with little in the way of 
economic damages have a hard time finding lawyers. ‘If their claim is not of high monetary 
value, then it’s hard for them to find an attorney,’ says Dr. Donald J. Palmisano, 
immediate past president of the AMA.”). 
 13. Id. (describing such a scenario).  
 14. Id. 
 15. Act of July 25, 2011, ch. 400, sec.	3, §	1A-1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1712, 1713–14 
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	1A-1, Rule 9(j) (2015)); sec.	4, §	8C-702(h), 2011 N.C. Sess. 
Laws at 1714 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	8C-702(h) (2015)); secs.	5–7, §§	90-21.11–12, 
2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1714–16 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§	90-21.11–12, 19 (2015)); 
Act of June 27, 2011, ch. 317, §	1A-1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1253, 1253–54 (codified at N.C. 
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evidentiary, and substantive changes to North Carolina’s preexisting 
medical malpractice law, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
bring successful medical malpractice claims at nearly every phase of 
litigation.16 
This Comment will first analyze the three major types of changes 
made by these reforms—procedural, evidentiary, and substantive—
and the impact of these reforms on medical malpractice claims before, 
during, and after trial, and on the various plaintiff groups bringing 
such claims. This Comment will next look to the available North 
Carolina data to determine what effects these reforms have already 
had on plaintiffs’ claims. Next, because personal data about plaintiffs 
in medical malpractice cases is not made publicly available in North 
Carolina, this Comment will rely on tort reform bills passed in other 
states where these data are publicly available to explore the possible 
discriminatory effects the reform legislation may have on various 
plaintiff groups in North Carolina. This Comment posits that the 
combination of these procedural, evidentiary, and substantive 
changes have not only led to a permanent decrease in the number of 
medical malpractice claims being filed, but have also created a 
discriminatory system that prevents certain groups of plaintiffs—
namely the poor—from having their rightful day in court. This 
Comment will then consider the constitutionality of these reforms in 
an effort to predict their likely future effects. Finally, this Comment 
will suggest possible alternatives to the current medical malpractice 
system in North Carolina. 
I.  STATUTORY REFORMS 
North Carolina’s tort reforms made significant procedural, 
evidentiary, and substantive changes to the state’s medical 
malpractice laws. These changes—particularly the noneconomic 
damages cap—have played a significant role in curtailing the ability of 
a plaintiff to recover damages and benefiting defendant-physicians at 
the expense of plaintiffs. The most controversial portion of these 
reforms has been the $500,000 liability limit for noneconomic 
 
Gen. Stat. §	1A-1, Rule 7(b)(4) (2015)); An Act to Provide Tort Reform for North 
Carolina Citizens and Businesses, ch. 283, sec.	1.3, §	8C-702(a), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1048, 
1049 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	8C-702(a) (2015)); see also Katherine Flynn Henry & 
Phillip Jackson, North Carolina’s Tort Reform: An Overview, N.C. ST. BUS. J., Spring 2012, 
at 12, 16 n.1 (“There are three session laws that comprise this tort reform legislation: (a) 
S.L. 2011-400 (S.B. 33), (b) S.L. 2011-283 (H.B. 542), and (c) S.L. 2011-317 (S.B. 586).”). 
While Senate Bill 33 has gained the most notoriety for its noneconomic damages cap, this 
Comment will refer to these collective changes as “the reforms” or “these reforms.”  
 16. Henry & Jackson, supra note 15, at 12–14. 
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damages,17 a change to the substantive law that drastically reduced 
the amount of damages that plaintiffs could be awarded.18 While this 
damages cap is certainly one of the biggest changes to the preexisting 
law, it is just one of several significant statutory reforms that benefit 
defendant-physicians at the expense of plaintiffs. For example, these 
reforms set a higher procedural standard for the pre-filing expert 
witness review requirement, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
successfully file a medical malpractice claim and increasing litigation 
costs.19 These reforms also raised the evidentiary standard for expert 
witnesses to provide causation opinions, adding a challenge for 
plaintiffs trying to find qualified experts to testify during trial.20 
Furthermore, these reforms raised the evidentiary standard for all 
emergency medical conditions, even if they occur outside of an 
emergency room setting, providing physicians with more protection 
from malpractice complaints than required under federal law.21 This 
Comment will analyze the procedural, evidentiary, and substantive 
changes in this order and explain why each of these changes has 
decreased plaintiffs’ abilities to bring successful malpractice claims. 
A. Procedural Changes 
These reforms included several procedural changes to North 
Carolina’s preexisting law that have made it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to reach the trial stage when filing medical malpractice 
claims. Most notably, these reforms included amending North 
Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 9(j) to make the plaintiffs’ pre-filing 
expert witness review requirement more stringent.22 “The legislature 
specifically drafted Rule 9(j) to govern the initiation of medical 
malpractice actions”23 in North Carolina in order to “prevent 
frivolous malpractice claims by requiring expert review before filing 
 
 17. See id. at 14, 16 (supporting the passage of such reforms). But see Craige, supra 
note 4, at 16 (questioning the true rationale behind these reforms). 
 18. See Act of July 25, 2011, ch. 400, sec.	7, §	90-21.19, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1715–
16. 
 19. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	1A-9(j) (2015); Henry & Jackson, supra note 15, at 12; 
infra text accompanying notes 43–45 (discussing expert witness costs). 
 20. See §	8C-702(h); Henry & Jackson, supra note 15, at 13. 
 21. See §	90-21.12(b) (requring proof by clear and convincing evidence); Henry & 
Jackson, supra note 15, at 14; see also 42 U.S.C. §	1395dd(e)(1)(B) (2012); Elizabeth Hill, 
Recent Development, Senate Bill 33 Grants Protection to Emergency Room Providers	.	.	. 
and Just about Everyone Else, Too, 91 N.C. L. REV. 720, 720–21 (2013). 
 22. See Act of July 25, 2011, ch. 400, sec.	3, §	1A-9(j), N.C. Sess. Laws at 1713–14 
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	1A-9(j)); Henry & Jackson, supra note 15, at 12.  
 23. Thigpen v. Ngo, 355 N.C. 198, 203, 558 S.E.2d 162, 166 (2002). 
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of the action.”24 Given the high cost of medical malpractice litigation, 
such a requirement should serve to limit the amount of leverage a 
plaintiff has when attempting to settle a frivolous claim.25 “It is well 
established that if a complaint is filed without a Rule 9(j) certification, 
Rule 9(j) mandates that the trial court grant a defendant’s motion to 
dismiss.”26 Formerly, Rule 9(j) stated that 
[a]ny complaint alleging medical malpractice by a health care 
provider . . . shall be dismissed unless: (1) The pleading 
specifically asserts that the medical care has been reviewed by a 
person who is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert 
witness under Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence and who is 
willing to testify that the medical care did not comply with the 
applicable standard of care.27 
Under this former version of the rule, only a cursory review of 
medical records was required for a complaint alleging medical 
malpractice to be deemed in compliance with Rule 9(j).28 For 
example, in Hylton v. Koontz,29 a medical malpractice claim was 
brought on behalf of the decedent after a gallbladder removal 
procedure resulted in his death.30 In this case, the plaintiff’s counsel 
provided a summary of the plaintiff’s medical care on the telephone 
to an expert witness.31 The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that 
although an expert witness did not review the plaintiff’s actual 
medical records prior to the filing of the complaint, “[a] review of a 
summary of the treatment provided to a patient [was] sufficient 
compliance with Rule 9(j),” reasoning that “[t]here is no requirement 
the expert review the actual medical records prior to expressing his 
opinion with regard to the medical care provided.”32 Based on this 
 
 24. Moore v. Proper, 366 N.C. 25, 31, 726 S.E.2d 812, 817 (2012) (affirming language 
used in Thigpen, 355 N.C. at 203, 558 S.E.2d at 166 following the passage of the 2011 
reforms). 
 25. See infra notes 110–15 and accompanying text (discussing expert witness costs). 
 26. Ford v. McCain, 192 N.C. App. 667, 671, 666 S.E.2d 153, 156 (2008) 
(demonstrating the importance of Rule 9(j) filings even before the requirements were 
tightened by the 2011 tort reform statutes). 
 27. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	1A-9(j) (2009) amended by Act of July 25, 2011, ch. 400, sec. 3, 
§	1A-9(j), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1712, 1713–14 (2011) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	1A-
9(j) (2015)).  
 28. See Henry & Jackson, supra note 15, at 12. 
 29. 138 N.C. App. 511, 530 S.E.2d 108 (2000). 
 30. Id. at 512, 530 S.E.2d at 109. 
 31. Id. at 513, 530 S.E.2d at 109. 
 32. Id. at 515–16, 530 S.E.2d at 111. 
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information, the plaintiff’s expert witness argued that the defendant-
physician breached the applicable standard of care.33 
Plaintiffs now face a higher procedural standard under Rule 9(j), 
which was amended to require the dismissal of a medical malpractice 
claim unless: 
The pleading specifically asserts that the medical care and all 
medical records pertaining to the alleged negligence that are 
available to the plaintiff after reasonable inquiry have been 
reviewed by a person who is reasonably expected to qualify as 
an expert witness under Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence and 
who is willing to testify that the medical care did not comply 
with the applicable standard of care.34 
Hylton thus serves as a prime example of a case that would likely 
be dismissed under today’s statute.35 In Hylton, the plaintiff’s expert 
witness relied upon a summary of the medical care provided via a 
phone conversation.36 Under the amended Rule 9(j), this would be 
unlikely to qualify as a review of “all medical records pertaining to 
the alleged negligence that are available to the plaintiff after 
reasonable inquiry.”37 Not only does this change to Rule 9(j) create a 
higher procedural standard, but it also places a more onerous burden 
on plaintiffs to file a claim within the three-year statute of limitations, 
as requests for medical records can take some time to process.38 
Furthermore, it is likely that this stricter procedural standard will 
increase the costs of pre-trial preparation, as attorneys must spend 
more hours accumulating and reviewing all reasonably available 
medical records relevant to the case at hand. While medical 
malpractice plaintiffs are able to retain counsel on a contingency 
basis,39 they are explicitly precluded by state law from hiring expert 
 
 33. Id. at 516, 530 S.E.2d at 111. 
 34. Act of July 25, 2011, ch. 400, sec.	3, §	1A-9(j), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1712, 1713–14 
(codified at N.C. GEN STAT §	1A-9(j) (2015)) (emphasis added). 
 35. Although no North Carolina case has explicitly overruled Hylton, the amended 
statute seems to directly oppose Hylton’s holding. 
 36. Hylton, 138 N.C. App. at 513, 530 S.E.2d at 109. 
 37. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	1A-9(j) (2015); see also Henry & Jackson, supra note 15, at 12 
(“The revised Rule 9(j) makes clear that such a cursory review is no longer sufficient. Rule 
9(j) now requires that the material reviewed must include ‘all medical records pertaining 
to the alleged negligence that are available to the plaintiff after reasonable inquiry.’”). 
 38. §	1-15(c); Donovan, supra note 4 (providing the opinions of a North Carolina 
plaintiff’s attorney, stating that “[j]ust because you send a request for medical records 
doesn’t mean that you receive those records in a timely fashion”). 
 39. See Contingency Fee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“A fee charged 
for a lawyer’s services only if the lawsuit is successful or is favorably settled out of court. 
Contingent fees are usu[ally] calculated as a percentage of the client’s net recovery .	.	.	.”).  
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witnesses to testify on such a basis.40 Therefore, the plaintiff or 
plaintiff’s attorney must bear these costs.41 
While the costs of expert witnesses vary dramatically, medical 
experts tend to cost more than other expert witnesses.42 According to 
one study, while the national average hourly fee for file review and 
preparation for non-medical experts was $245, the same hourly fee for 
medical experts was $350.43 Furthermore, while the average hourly 
fee for trial testimony by non-medical experts was $275, the same 
hourly fee for medical experts was $500.44 
By increasing the costs of litigation, low-income plaintiffs are 
placed in a disadvantageous position because they may not be able to 
afford these increased fees. Moreover, even if plaintiffs’ attorneys are 
willing to front these costs, this may come at the expense of a greater 
contingency fee, limiting the amount of money a successful plaintiff 
may ultimately receive.45 Given the necessity of expert witnesses in 
medical malpractice cases,46 the inability of plainitffs to pay—or the 
unwillingness of plaintiffs’ attorneys to front—expert witness costs 
may severely hinder a plaintiff’s chances of succeeding on a 
meritorious claim. 
 
 40. §	8C-702(f) (“In an action alleging medical malpractice, an expert witness shall not 
testify on a contingency fee basis.”). 
 41. Paying Experts, AM. B. ASS’N (Winter 1997), https://www.americanbar.org
/content/newsletter/publications/solo_newsletter_home/payexprt.html [https://perma.cc
/H5HP-GUDA] (“While many law firms are willing to cover the costs of expert witnesses 
and hope for reimbursement out of the winnings, it is not uncommon for lawyers to ask 
clients to help pay the costs up front.”).  
 42. See Expert Witness Fee Calculator, THE EXPERT INST., 
https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/expert-witness-fees/ [https://perma.cc/294L-79SL] 
(comparing the costs of medical and non-medical experts); Expert Witness Fees: How 
Much Does An Expert Witness Cost?, SEAK, INC., http://blog.seakexperts.com/expert-
witness-fees-how-much-does-an-expert-witness-cost/ [https://perma.cc/GA97-VSR6] 
(providing the results of a study done by SEAK, Inc., an expert witness directory). 
 43. Expert Witness Fees: How Much Does An Expert Witness Cost?, supra note 42.  
 44. Id.  
 45. See Paying Experts, supra note 41 (describing a situation in which an attorney was 
willing to reduce her contingency fee if clients would bear these up front costs).  
 46. See B. Sonny Bal, The Expert Witness in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 467 
CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS AND RELATED RES. 383, 383 (Feb. 2009), 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11999-008-0634-4.pdf [https://perma.cc
/73XJ-PVXM] (“A member of the profession is needed to tell the judge and jury what the 
defending physician should have done or not done under the particular circumstances, and 
whether such conduct constituted negligence by violating the standards of care of the 
profession. Therefore, in medical malpractice litigation, expert witness testimony is nearly 
always necessary.”). 
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B. Evidentiary Changes 
In addition to these procedural changes, several evidentiary 
reforms were passed, increasing plaintiffs’ burdens during trial. These 
reforms amended North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702(a) regarding 
the sufficiency of expert witness testimony47 and increased the 
evidentiary standard for claims filed under the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”)48 from a 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard to a “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard.49 
1.  Amendment to North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702(a) 
As previously written, the rule stated that “[i]f scientific, 
technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.”50 These 
reforms, however, amended North Carolina Rule of Evidence 
702(a)51 to better align with Federal Rule of Evidence 70252—titled 
“Testimony by Expert Witnesses”—based on the standard the 
Supreme Court set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.53 The revised rule keeps the entirety of the former’s language but 
 
 47. An Act to Provide Tort Reform for North Carolina Citizens and Businesses, ch. 
283, sec.	1.3, §	8C-702(a), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1048, 1049 (2011) (codified at N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §	8C-702(a) (2015)); see also Robert C. Ervin, Applying North Carolina Rule of 
Evidence 702(a), at 1 (Oct. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites
/www.sog.unc.edu/files/course_materials/R15%20Daubert%20Presentation%202015.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/ZJ3S-MCFU] (explaining the various implications of this amended rule).  
 48. See 42 U.S.C. §	1395dd (2012). 
 49. Act of July 25, 2011, ch. 400, §	6, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1712, 1715 (codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §	90-21.12(b) (2015)).  
 50. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	8C-702(a) (2009). 
 51. An Act to Provide Tort Reform for North Carolina Citizens and Businesses, Ch. 
283, sec. 1.3, §	8C-702(a), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1048, 1049 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§	8C-702(a) (2015)). 
 52. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 53. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court struck down 
the “general acceptance” standard established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 
Cir. 1923) in regards to the admissibility of scientific evidence. Id. at 597.  
In an attempt to give guidance to the lower courts in making a determination of 
scientific reliability, the Court suggested a nonexclusive list of factors to be 
considered. Specifically mentioned were (1) whether the technique or theory can 
be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer 
review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence 
and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) the degree to which the theory 
or technique has been generally accepted in the scientific community.  
96 N.C. L. REV. 512 (2018) 
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adds that a witness may only testify as a qualified expert “if all of the 
following apply: (1) [t]he testimony is based upon sufficient facts or 
data[;] (2) [t]he testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods[; and] (3) [t]he witness has applied the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts of the case.”54 
North Carolina courts have recognized the difference between 
the former North Carolina standard and the federal standard. Prior to 
the passing of this amendment to the North Carolina rule, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina observed that the “application of 
the North Carolina approach is decidedly less mechanistic and 
rigorous than the ‘exacting standards of reliability’ demanded by the 
federal approach.”55 Under the former standard, once a trial court 
made a preliminary determination about the reliability of any expert’s 
proffered testimony, “any lingering questions or controversy 
concerning the quality of the expert’s conclusions [went] to the weight 
of the testimony rather than its admissibility.”56 Therefore, the 
previous approach “significantly curtailed the ability of the trial court 
to serve as a gatekeeper related to expert testimony.”57 Five years 
after these reforms were passed, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina finally held that “the General Assembly has made it clear 
that North Carolina is now a Daubert state.”58 
Under the standard set forth in Daubert and its progeny,59 which 
is now implemented in North Carolina, the quality and reliability of 
 
Kenneth S. Broun, Scientific Evidence in North Carolina After Howerton—A Presumption 
of Admissibility?, 10 N.C. ST. BUS. J. 8, 9 (2005) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94). For 
an extensive analysis on the effects of Daubert on medical testimony in other states, see 
Gerald J. Todaro, The Admissibility of Medical Testimony in Ohio: Daubert, Joiner, and 
Ohio’s Relevance-Reliability Standard, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319 (1998).  
 54. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	8C-702(a) (2015). 
 55. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 464, 597 S.E.2d 674, 690 (2004) 
(quoting Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 445 (2000)), superseded by statute, An Act 
to Provide Tort Reform for North Carolina Citizens and Businesses, Ch. 283, sec. 1.3, 
§	8C-702(a), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1049, as recognized in State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 
880, 787 S.E.2d (2016). 
 56. Id. at 461, 597 S.E.2d at 688. 
 57. Henry & Jackson, supra note 15, at 13. 
 58. State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 880, 886–88, 787 S.E.2d 1, 7–8 (2016) (overturning 
Howerton). In Howerton, the Supreme Court of North Carolina stated that “North 
Carolina is not, nor has it ever been, a Daubert jurisdiction.” 358 N.C. at 469, 597 S.E.2d at 
693. 
 59. The “Daubert trilogy” refers to three cases—Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., General Electric Co. v. Joiner, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael—
providing guidance on the admission of of scientific evidence according to Federal Rule 
702. See Megan Dillhoff, Science, Law, and Truth: Defining the Scope of the Daubert 
Trilogy, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1289, 1290 (2011). These cases each deal with a 
different aspect of this standard. See Kumho Tire Co. v Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 
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expert testimony is considered before such evidence may be ruled 
admissible.60 There is no doubt that this new standard provides judges 
with a greater gatekeeper role in determining the admissibility of 
expert testimony, rather than assigning the jury with this task.61 
Theoretically, this more exacting evidentiary standard should make it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to introduce expert testimony at trial, 
since Daubert requires that each of the three factors be met in order 
for an expert witness to provide an opinion.62 Indeed, “[c]ritics of 
medical malpractice litigation expressed optimism that Daubert would 
eliminate unreliable expert testimony in these cases.”63 However, the 
impact that this change has had on medical malpractice cases is 
unclear.64 While cases exist in Daubert states where a trial judge 
excluded expert witness testimony under this heightened standard,65 it 
is difficult to say whether such testimony would have been excluded 
under the previous standard as well.66 Thus, the impact of Daubert on 
 
(1999) (holding that Daubert applies not only to scientific testimony, but to all expert 
testimony); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143, 154 (1997) (holding that a court’s 
focus must be on the methodology and techniques used by expert witnesses, rather than 
their conclusions, while also stressing the importance of deference to trial courts); Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993) (providing a list of several 
nonexclusive factors for courts to consider). 
 60. See McGrady, 368 N.C. at 892–93, 787 S.E.2d at 10–11 (“The trial court .	.	. 
concludes, based on these findings, whether the proffered expert testimony meets Rule 
702(a)’s requirements of qualification, relevance, and reliability.”). 
 61. See Dillhoff, supra note 59, at 1290 (“Importantly, [Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho 
Tire] assign the role of gatekeeper primarily to judges rather than juries when it comes to 
scientific evidence and testimony.”); Henry & Jackson, supra note 15, at 13 (describing the 
“robust gatekeeper role” of the trial court in regards to expert testimony under this new 
standard).  
 62. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94; see also An Act to Provide Tort Reform for 
North Carolina Citizens and Businesses, Ch. 283, sec.	1.3, §	8C-702(a), 2011 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 1048, 1049 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	8C-702(a) (2015)). 
 63. Expertise in Law, Medicine, and Health Care, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS. (Apr. 2011), https://archive.ahrq.gov/research/findings/evidence-based-reports
/jhppl/shuman2.html [https://perma.cc/34PS-Q8XC].  
 64. Id. (“From the few reported cases addressing Daubert’s application to standard-
of-care issues in medical malpractice cases, no clear pattern of more rigorous scrutiny 
emerges.”).  
 65. See Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817, 830, 832 (Iowa 1997) (holding that the 
trial court abused its discretion under Daubert in medical malpractice case by excluding 
expert’s testimony, stating that “[w]e do not accept the proposition that statistical proof 
has to be presented before a medical expert can testify on causation”); Bunting v. 
Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 474 (Wyo. 1999) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion 
under Daubert by excluding expert testimony of physician on causation issue in medical 
malpractice case based upon judgment of failure to satisfy the Daubert “peer review” 
factor). 
 66. Since general acceptance is still a factor considered under Daubert, it is plausible 
that expert witness testimony that is not generally accepted would fail both the general 
acceptance test established in Frye as well as the stricter standard set forth in Daubert. See 
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the difficulty for plaintiffs of introducing expert testimony in medical 
malpractice cases has been described as “modest.”67 
2.  Change in Evidentiary Standard for EMTALA Claims 
Under the preexisting law, medical malpractice cases based on 
claims that defendants provided improper emergency medical care 
required a “greater weight of the evidence” standard as the burden of 
proof.68 Moreover, the statute as previously written made no 
distinction between ordinary and emergency medical conditions.69 
These reforms, however, amended the statute to increase the burden 
of proof for emergency medical conditions, raising it from a “greater 
weight of the evidence”70 to a “clear and convincing” evidentiary 
standard.71 The amended statute reads: 
In any medical malpractice action arising out of the furnishing 
or the failure to furnish professional services in the treatment of 
an emergency medical condition, as the term “emergency 
medical condition” is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1), the 
claimant must prove a violation of the standards of practice set 
forth in subsection (a) of this section by clear and convincing 
evidence.72 
The “clear and convincing” standard “means that the party must 
present evidence that leaves the [factfinder] with a firm belief or 
conviction that it is highly probable that the factual contentions of the 
claim or defense are true.”73 While this standard “does not require 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” it “is a higher standard of proof 
 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (“Finally, ‘general 
acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.”). Courts undertaking a Daubert 
analysis, however, do not indicate whether such testimony would meet this previous 
standard. See id. 
 67. Expertise in Law, Medicine, and Health Care, supra note 63.  
 68. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	90-21.12 (2009) (“[T]he defendant health care provider 
shall not be liable for the payment of damages unless the trier of the facts is satisfied by 
the greater weight of the evidence that the care of such health care provider was not in 
accordance with the standards of practice .	.	.	.”). 
 69. See Act of May 12, 1976, ch. 977, sec. 4, § 8-93, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 4 (codified 
as amended at N.C. Gen. Stat. §	90-21.12 (2015)); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §	90-21.12 
(2009); infra notes 77–88 and accompanying text (defining an emergency medical 
condition).  
 70. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	90-21.12 (2009).  
 71. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	90-21.12(b) (2015).  
 72. Id. (emphasis added). 
 73. NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMMITTEE, MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT §	1.7 (2017), 
www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/sites/default/files/WPD/Civil_Instructions_2017
_9.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DEW-S5AB]. 
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than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”74 The rationale 
behind raising the burden of proof for emergency room physicians is 
understandable, as these physicians would otherwise be at extreme 
risk of malpractice allegations due to the high-risk nature of their 
work.75 However, this reform protects all physicians—not just 
emergency room physicians—with this increased standard, provided 
that the claim arose from an emergency medical condition.76 This is 
due to the interplay between North Carolina’s standard of care 
statute and the chosen definition of an emergency medical condition. 
The North Carolina statute uses the same definition of 
emergency medical condition as EMTALA, which defines the term 
as: 
[A] medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of 
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence 
of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected 
to result in—(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with 
respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her 
unborn child) in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to 
bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ 
or part . . . .77 
The definition of emergency medical condition also encompasses 
situations in which there is inadequate time to safely transfer a 
pregnant woman before delivery or when such a transfer would pose 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Aaron E. Carroll & Jennifer L. Buddenbaum, High and Low-Risk Specialties 
Experience with the U.S. Medical Malpractice System, BIOMED CENT. HEALTH SERVS. 
RES. (Nov. 6, 2013), http://bmchealthservres.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1472-
6963-13-465 [http://perma.cc/9CJM-9VKW] (defining “emergency medicine, general 
surgery, obstetrics and gynecologic surgery, and radiology as .	.	. ‘high-liability risk’ 
specialties”). Because these physicians work in an “information-poor, high-risk .	.	. 
environment,” the common fear is that these physicians are most at risk of practicing 
defensive medicine, thus increasing overall healthcare spending. See Steve Cohen, On Tort 
Reform, It’s Time to Declare Victory and Withdraw, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2015, 9:59 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevecohen/2015/03/02/on-tort-reform-its-time-to-declare-
victory-and-withdraw/2/#70f9fda43388 [http://perma.cc/T8QP-AD9M].  
 76. Henry & Jackson, supra note 15, at 14 (noting that the North Carolina reform 
legislation should cover situations involving emergency medical treatment “no matter the 
specialty of the health care provided involved”).  
 77. §	1395dd(e)(1)(A). The Supreme Court of North Carolina has found federal 
jurisprudence persuasive when defining such conditions, agreeing that “emergency 
medical conditions are sudden, severe and short-lived physical injuries or illnesses that 
require immediate treatment to prevent further harm.” Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 
N.C. 384, 387–88, 628 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2006) (quoting Greenery Rehab. Grp., Inc. v. Hammon, 
150 F.3d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 1998)); see Craige, supra note 4, at 17 (“Following Diaz, our 
courts must confine the heightened burden of proof to those rare emergency situations in 
which ‘instant’ actions was required to prevent serious harm.”).  
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a threat to the woman or her unborn child.78 It is important to note, 
however, that the EMTALA definition of an emergency medical 
condition does not specify that such a condition must arise only in an 
emergency room setting.79 Within the context of the rest of the 
EMTALA statute, federal EMTALA claims brought alleging an 
improper medical screening always arise from an allegedly improper 
screening or failure to screen that took place in a hospital’s 
emergency department.80 Thus, it would have been redundant for 
Congress to specify that the statute only applies to emergency 
medical conditions arising in a hospital’s emergency department. 
In contrast to the federal law, the amended North Carolina law 
extends to a much broader range of medical settings than just 
emergency departments. By utilizing the EMTALA definition of an 
emergency medical condition, without the context of the entire 
EMTALA statute requiring that the condition arise in an emergency 
department,81 the North Carolina General Assembly allowed for the 
clear and convincing evidentiary standard to apply “well beyond 
those situations where the health care provider is an emergency room 
physician.”82 For example, since EMTALA’s emergency medical 
condition definition includes cases in which a pregnant woman is in 
active labor and about to deliver,83 many malpractice allegations 
stemming from childbirth must now pass the “clear and convincing” 
evidence standard, rather than the lower “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard.84 As a result, many obstetricians are provided 
extra protection from medical malpractice complaints, even in cases 
of ordinary childbirth.85 
The expansive application of this broad definition has even led 
some to raise the question of legislative intent, arguing that the 
 
 78. §	1395dd(e)(1)(B). 
 79. See §	1395dd(e). 
 80. §	1395dd(a) (“In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, 
if any individual .	.	. comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the 
individual’s behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must 
provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the 
hospital’s emergency department, including ancillary services routinely available to the 
emergency department, to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition .	.	. 
exists.” (emphasis added)).  
 81. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	90-21.12(d) (2015). 
 82. Henry & Jackson, supra note 15, at 14. 
 83. 42 U.S.C. §	1395dd(e)(1)(B).  
 84. See Hill, supra note 21, at 721 (exploring the possibly unintended effects of the 
protections offered by this reform). 
 85. Id. (explaining how the amended statute changed malpractice claims in the field of 
obstetrics). 
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General Assembly may not have intended to use such a broad 
definition.86 In fact, each of the five earlier edited versions and the 
original filed version of this bill explicitly limited its protection to 
emergency medical conditions in a hospital’s emergency 
department.87 Furthermore, “other legislative history—including 
committee hearing minutes and committee bill summaries—suggests 
that the General Assembly intended for the protection to apply solely 
to hospital emergency providers.”88 Given the legislature’s apparent 
focus on the emergency room setting, it is surprising that the General 
Assembly ultimately passed such a broad provision. 
Regardless of the General Assembly’s precise intent, it is clear 
that the law as it currently stands provides another example of how 
these reforms have made it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail at 
trial by providing extra protection to a wide range of physicians, 
rather than only to emergency room physicians. Whether this 
amendment was intended to apply so broadly or not, applying this 
increased evidentiary burden to a wide array of medical situations 
provides yet another example of how the legislature has protected 
defendant-physicians to the detriment of plaintiffs. 
 
 86. Id. at 720 (arguing that by failing to limit this definition to emergency room health 
care providers, “the General Assembly inadvertently or unwisely extended the heightened 
protection intended solely for emergency room health care providers to providers in a 
myriad of other contexts”). 
 87. Id. at 722–24 (citing S.B. 33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Draft (N.C. Apr. 20, 
2011) (“In any medical malpractice action arising out of the furnishing or the failure to 
furnish professional services in a hospital emergency room, the claimant must prove a 
violation of the standard of health care set forth in subsection (a) of this section by clear 
and convincing evidence”); S.B. 33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Draft (N.C. Apr. 19, 
2011) (“In any medical malpractice action arising out of .	.	. professional services in a 
hospital emergency room .	.	.	.”); S.B. 33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Draft (Mar. 2, 
2011) (“In any medical malpractice action arising out of the furnishing or the failure to 
furnish services imposed by [EMTALA] for an emergency medical condition.	.	.	.”); S.B. 
33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Draft (Mar. 1, 2011) (“In any medical malpractice 
action arising out of the furnishing or the failure to furnish services pursuant to obligations 
imposed by [EMTALA] .	.	.	.”); S.B. 33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Draft (N.C. Feb. 
3, 2011) (“In any medical malpractice action arising out of .	.	. services pursuant to 
obligations imposed by [EMTALA] for an emergency medical condition .	.	.	.”); S.B. 33, 
2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Draft (N.C. Feb. 2, 2011) (“In any medical malpractice 
action arising out of the provision of emergency services as defined in G.S. 58-3-190(g)(2) 
[including the screening and treatment of emergency conditions in emergency 
departments].”)).  
 88. Id. at 724. For example, Senator Nesbitt stated that “the ER is a very special 
institution” and that “those guys deserve some special protections.” Id. (citing Senate 
Judiciary I Committee Feb. 24, 2011 Minutes, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011)).  
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C. Substantive Changes 
While these increased procedural, evidentiary, and substantive 
burdens have significantly affected many aspects of medical 
malpractice law by making it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring 
successful malpractice claims, the most controversial change to the 
preexisting law has been the $500,00089 liability limit for noneconomic 
damages.90 This cap serves to limit the amount of noneconomic 
damages a successful plaintiff may receive. Thus, if a jury awards a 
plaintiff $1 million in noneconomic damages for pain and suffering, 
this amount will be reduced to the statutory limit of $500,000.91 
Noneconomic damages are defined as “[d]amages to compensate for 
pain, suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium, inconvenience, 
and any other nonpecuniary compensatory damage.”92 Punitive 
damages are not considered noneconomic damages under this 
definition.93 In contrast, economic damages include “compensation 
for objectively verifiable monetary losses such as past and future 
medical expenses, [and the] loss of past and future earnings.”94 
Before the passage of these reforms, no such damages cap 
existed in North Carolina.95 By its very nature, the damages cap 
portion of the statute was added in order to limit jury awards in 
medical malpractice cases. The jury is not informed of the existence 
of this cap,96 and any jury awards including more than $500,000 in 
noneconomic damages will be modified by the judge to conform to 
the damages cap.97 
There is an exception to this rule, however, if the trier of fact 
finds both that “[t]he plaintiff suffered disfigurement, loss of use of 
part of the body, permanent injury or death” and “[t]he defendant’s 
acts or failures, which are the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 
injuries, were committed in reckless disregard of the rights of others, 
 
 89. Every three years, the $500,000 limit is subject to adjustments to account for 
inflation based on the Consumer Price Index. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	90-21.19(a) (2015). For 
convenience sake, this Comment will refer to the cap limit as $500,000 although it is 
slightly higher today. 
 90. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text (describing this controversy). 
 91. See §	90-21.19(a) (“Judgment shall not be entered against any defendant for 
noneconomic damages in excess of five hundred thousand dollars .	.	.	.”). 
 92. §	90-21.19(c)(2). 
 93. Id. 
 94. AM. COLL. OF SURGEONS, supra note 11. 
 95. N.C. GEN STAT §	90-21.19 (2009) (amended by Act of July 25, ch. 400, §	7, 2011 
N.C. Sess. Laws 1712, 1715–16 (2011) (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §	90-21.19 (2015)) 
(stating North Carolina’s medical malpractice policy before the damages cap was enacted). 
 96. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	90-21.19(d) (2015). 
 97. §	90-21.19(a). 
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grossly negligent, fraudulent, intentional or with malice.”98 In other 
words, plaintiffs who suffer catastrophic injury must prove that the 
defendant acted with either gross negligence or reckless disregard of 
the patient’s rights in order to circumvent the damages cap.99 
Therefore, the exception primarily accounts for the extreme cases 
where a physician’s conduct is so egregious that his mental state can 
be implicitly proven by his actions. In those extreme and unusual 
situations where a physician unnecessarily places a patient at risk of 
serious harm, such as where a negligent doctor was incapacitated by 
drugs or alcohol, the exception may apply and the cap will not limit 
the awarded noneconomic damages.100 
II.  CONSEQUENCES OF TORT REFORM IN NORTH CAROLINA ON 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE FILINGS 
As previously discussed, each facet of these reforms serves to 
increase the burden on plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases. The 
restructured procedural and evidentiary requirements make reaching 
the trial stage increasingly difficult and expensive for plaintiffs, and 
plaintiffs who are able to prevail at trial face a limit on the amount of 
money they are able to recover. Therefore, these reforms have led to 
a seemingly permanent decrease in the number of medical 
malpractice claims filed, as the likelihood of attorneys taking on 
malpractice cases is similarly diminishing.101 
Although these reforms went into effect in 2011, data on the 
number of medical malpractice suits filed before and after the 
reforms only recently indicate that the reforms have led to a more 
permanent decrease in filings of these cases. Between 1998 and 2003, 
an annual average of 617 medical malpractice suits were filed in 
North Carolina, approximately 51.4 suits each month.102 Between 
 
 98. §	90-21.19(b).  
 99. See Craige, supra note 4, at 17. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has 
interpreted gross negligence to be an act “done purposely and with knowledge that such 
act is a breach of duty to others, i.e., a conscious disregard of the safety of others.” Yancey 
v. Lea, 354 N.C. 48, 53, 550 S.E.2d 155, 158 (2001). 
 100. Craige, supra note 4, at 17 (stating that although this exception exists, few cases 
will actually fall within this egregious standard). 
 101. See Donovan, supra note 4 (“[S]ome cases that previously might have brought in 
big verdicts are now difficult for lawyers to justify taking on given the high cost of 
litigating medical malpractice claims and the uncertainty of prevailing on them.”); 
Zimmerman & Hallinan, supra note 1 (arguing that damages caps are forcing attorneys to 
turn away medical malpractice claims from plaintiffs with legitimate claims who don’t 
represent big economic losses); see also infra Part III (discussing plaintiffs’ attorneys’ 
increased reliance on economic damages). 
 102. Craige, supra note 5, at 9. 
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2000 and 2003, the number of malpractice suits filed remained 
relatively stable, rising only one percent in the three-year period, 
below the rate of population growth over the same time period.103 In 
the 26 months prior to September 2011, the average number of 
medical malpractice cases filed in state courts dropped to 40.1 suits 
each month.104 Once it became clear, however, that the damages cap 
was going into effect, plaintiffs rushed to file their claims in court 
before the damages cap would take effect, and in September 2011, the 
number of cases increased more than eightfold to 322 cases in a single 
month.105 Between 2013 and 2015, an average of 25.5 medical 
malpractice cases have been filed in state courts each month, a 36.4% 
reduction in cases from the 26-month period before 2011.106 
This increase in cases, and the subsequent decline, was 
reasonably expected. Because the statute of limitations for medical 
malpractice cases is three years,107 it is possible that many people who 
filed their claims in September 2011 otherwise may have waited to 
bring these claims sometime between 2011 and 2014. Thus, in the 
three years following this change, an even greater lag in case filings 
could be expected than would be seen over the long term, since many 
of these cases were filed in 2011, rather than being evenly dispersed 
between 2011 and 2014. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine how 
long it will take for the average number of cases to stabilize, although 
now that more than three years have passed since the law took effect, 
it is becoming increasingly practical to analyze the impact of these 
reforms.108 It appears as if the number of medical malpractice case 
filings will remain below what was seen before these reforms were 
enacted. 
III.  INCREASED RELIANCE BY PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEYS ON 
ECONOMIC DAMAGES 
While these statistics indicate that fewer medical malpractice 
claims are being filed since the passage of these reforms, statistics 
alone do not answer the question of why these claims are dropping. 
The increased procedural and evidentiary burdens certainly account 
for some of this decrease. The more plausible explanation for the 
 
 103. Id. at 8. 
 104. Donovan, supra note 4 (relying on data from the Administrative Office of the 
Courts). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	1-15(c) (2015). 
 108. Donovan, supra note 4. 
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extent of the decrease in case filings, however, is the consequence of 
the noneconomic damages cap, because attorneys are placing more 
emphasis on recovering economic damages,109 disproportionately 
harming low-income plaintiffs. 
Medical malpractice cases are costly for plaintiffs and potentially 
risky for their attorneys, who are typically paid on a contingency 
basis.110 In 2004, routine malpractice cases cost North Carolina 
plaintiffs over $50,000 in litigation expenses, while the cost to litigate 
more complex cases exceeded $100,000.111 Similar costs have been 
reported in other states, as one Texas attorney estimated that a 
typical case “involves hiring a half dozen expert witnesses and costs 
about $100,000.”112 Plaintiffs’ attorneys often accept these cases on a 
contingency basis,113 meaning these attorneys only get paid if they 
settle or win at trial.114 Therefore, attorneys already have an incentive 
to accept cases that they realistically think they can win.115 
In the wake of tort reform, attorneys now have even more of an 
incentive to only accept cases from the types of plaintiffs who can be 
expected to receive large payouts. This does not just mean plaintiffs 
with factually strong cases, but also plaintiffs who possess the qualities 
of a strong candidate for a large jury award based on economic 
damages.116 Because the damages cap only limits noneconomic 
damages, plaintiffs who can be expected to receive a large amount of 
economic damages are now much more valuable to attorneys paid on 
a contingency basis. Economic damages “can be estimated . . . and 
monetarily compensated.”117 These damages may include 
 
 109. See id. (expressing attorneys’ preferences for plaintiffs with high earning capacity).  
 110. Richie Kemp,	When Attorneys Come Back for Seconds: Increased Attorney Fees 
for Extraordinary Work in Medical Malpractice Cases, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 79, 89 (2004) 
(“A typical medical malpractice case is undertaken by a plaintiff’s attorney under 
a	contingent	fee	agreement.”).  
 111. Craige, supra note 5, at 9. 
 112. Zimmerman & Hallinan, supra note 1; see also Kemp, supra note 110, at 89 
(“[Attorneys]	ordinarily risk between $50,000 and $100,000 preparing and litigating the 
average	medical	malpractice	action.	They must take depositions, obtain expert testimony, 
and file numerous documents with the court, all of which costs money.”).  
 113. Kemp, supra note 110, at 89.  
 114. A contingent fee contract for legal services is a contract under which the amount 
or the payment of the attorney’s fee is dependent upon the outcome of the litigation or 
matter. Romulado P. Eclavea, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Contract 
Providing for Contingent Fee to Defendant’s Attorney, 9 A.L.R. 4th 191, 193 n.1 (1981). 
 115. Craige, supra note 5, at 9 (“If the patient loses, neither the patient nor the lawyer 
is paid anything. Recognizing these obstacles, attorneys know they risk financial ruin 
unless they file well-founded malpractice claims.”) 
 116. See Donavan, supra note 4 (expressing attorneys’ preferences for plaintiffs with 
high earning capacity). 
 117. Pecuniary Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
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compensation for objectively verifiable monetary losses, such as past 
and future medical expenses and the loss of past or future earnings.118 
In contrast, juries must make more fluid value determinations for 
noneconomic damages, as it is difficult to place an exact value on pain 
and suffering. While the value of medical expenses depends on the 
individual facts of each case, juries determine the value of past and 
future earnings based on the economic status of the plaintiff by 
analyzing the amount of past wages lost by the plaintiff due to the 
injury in addition to the prospective loss of future wages.119 If two 
plaintiffs present cases with equal injuries and medical expenses, the 
more valuable plaintiff will be the one with more lost wages. 
According to one North Carolina plaintiff’s attorney, young, working 
individuals possess far more value to juries in the context of lost 
wages, and therefore these reforms have caused juries to 
systematically devalue children, unemployed individuals, and retired 
individuals.120 
This phenomenon has proven true in other states with damages 
caps as well. For example, California’s Medical Injury Compensation 
Reform Act (“MICRA”), passed in 1975, limits all noneconomic 
damages awards in medical malpractice cases to $250,000.121 One 
California attorney recounted his experience handling virtually 
identical breast cancer patients.122 Both plaintiffs were mothers in 
their late forties, had two children, and ultimately died from the 
disease.123 “One plaintiff was a housewife and her case was settled for 
$300,000. The other was a Silicon Valley executive whose family won 
a $2 million settlement.”124 Other attorneys have cited similar stories. 
For example, one attorney handled two similar malpractice cases, 
each involving the death of a young mother.125 In each case, the jury 
awarded noneconomic damages of $3 million.126 Due to California’s 
cap on noneconomic damages, however, these awards were reduced 
to $250,000 as required under MICRA.127 One plaintiff who held a 
 
 118. AM. COLL. OF SURGEONS, supra note 11. 
 119. JACOB A. STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES §	9:5, at 9-14 (3d ed. 1997) 
(noting that economic damages are determined by “calculat[ing] the	lost	wages	of the 
claimant by simply determining what wages were being earned at the time of the injury 
and using the appropriate multiplier to arrive at the	[future] lost	wages	figure”).  
 120. See Donovan, supra note 4. 
 121. CAL. CIV. CODE §	3333.2 (West 2017).  
 122. See Zimmerman & Hallinan, supra note 1. 
 123. Id. 
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master’s degree and worked as a school administrator was awarded 
$1.6 million in economic damages, while the other plaintiff, an 
unmarried woman on welfare, received just $200,000 in economic 
damages.128 
These anecdotes provide poignant examples of situations where 
plaintiffs with factually similar cases received significantly different 
damages awards due to their relative economic status. This pattern is 
troubling because when noneconomic damages are capped, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys are forced to consider the likely economic damages in a 
case, thus making wealthy plaintiffs far more valuable to attorneys 
than low-income plaintiffs who are not expected to receive much in 
the form of economic damages. Given the high cost of medical 
malpractice cases, attorneys must make responsible fiscal judgments 
when taking on new cases, irrespective of the factual strength of such 
cases. Therefore, such caps serve to systematically devalue low-
income plaintiffs—even those with meritorious claims—who may not 
be able to command enough money in damages to justify attorneys 
taking on their cases. As a result, fewer cases are being filed. 
IV.  ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF NORTH CAROLINA’S TORT 
REFORM ON VARIOUS PLAINTIFF GROUPS VIA COMPARISONS TO 
STATES THAT PREVIOUSLY ENACTED SIMILAR REFORMS 
A. Comparing North Carolina to Texas 
In North Carolina, it is difficult to precisely assess to what extent 
different plaintiff groups have been affected by these reforms, since 
data about individual plaintiffs are not made publicly available. 
Unlike in North Carolina, data on individual medical malpractice 
plaintiffs are publicly available in Texas, a state that passed similar 
tort reform laws in 2003.129 These data can be used to predict what 
effects these laws may have on different plaintiff groups.130 However, 
there is one major caveat when making these comparisons: Texas 
 
 128. See Zimmerman & Hallinan, supra note 1. 
 129. See Act of June 10, 2003, ch. 204(G), §	74.301(a) (codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE ANN. §	74.301 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. & First Called Sess.)) 
(implementing a $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice claims as 
of Sept. 1, 2003). 
 130. See David A. Hyman et. al., Estimating the Effect of Damages Caps in Medical 
Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 335, 356–57 (2009) 
(using claims data from 1988 through 2004 to predict what effect Texas’s noneconomic 
damages cap had on various groups of plaintiffs). 
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capped its noneconomic damages at $250,000,131 half the amount set 
in North Carolina.132 Therefore, since lower noneconomic damages 
can be awarded in Texas than in North Carolina, it should come as no 
surprise that the effects of the Texas damages cap would be greater 
than what has been seen thus far in North Carolina.133 For example, 
while the number of medical malpractice claims in North Carolina 
have dropped by 36.4% from their pre-2011 levels,134 Texas has seen a 
roughly 70% decrease in the number of such claims between 2003 and 
2012.135 
While sources have extrapolated these statistics to estimate the 
effects of a $500,000 cap,136 there are certain variables that may not be 
accounted for, and therefore these numbers are best viewed as 
informed estimates, not ironclad predictions. For example, such 
retroactive simulation data cannot account for cases that were not 
accepted by attorneys due to the existence of a damages cap or 
plaintiffs that may have been deterred from ever filing a complaint in 
the first place, as these numbers only account for filed cases.137 
Despite these limitations, this information is still extremely 
valuable for several reasons. First, Texas passed its reforms in 2003, 
and therefore more scholarly research has been undertaken in Texas 
than in North Carolina, which passed its reform in 2011.138 Second, 
Texas makes the record of such cases publicly available; the Texas 
Closed Claims Database (“TCCD”) is a publicly accessible database 
that contains individual reports of closed professional liability 
 
 131. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §	74.301(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 
Reg. & First Called Sess.); see also Charles Silver, David A. Hyman, & Bernard S. Black, 
The Impact of the 2003 Texas Medical Malpractice Damages Cap on Physician Supply and 
Insurer Payouts: Separating Facts from Rhetoric, ADVOCATE, Fall 2008, at 25 (analyzing 
the effects of Texas’s $250,000 liability limit on noneconomic damages).  
 132. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	90-21.19(a) (2015). 
 133. See Hyman et al., supra note 130, at 389 (comparing the estimated effects of a 
$250,000 and $500,000 noneconomic damages cap on allowed verdicts and payouts).  
 134. Donovan, supra note 4. 
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insurance payouts by all defendants for claims exceeding $10,000.139 
North Carolina does not have such a publicly accessible database. 
A study by Hyman et al. applied the damages cap to pre-2003 
data to project the effects that Texas’s reforms had on medical 
malpractice plaintiffs, illustrating how such a cap has affected various 
groups of plaintiffs.140 The information from this study therefore 
serves as an estimate of the disparity between damages awarded prior 
to the reforms and those awarded after 2003. This study estimated 
that for tried cases, the Texas cap “would have eliminated 
approximately $119 million in non-economic damages, or 73 percent 
of allowed non-economic damages after other caps.”141 More 
specifically, this amounts to what would have been a 38% reduction 
in allowed verdicts, the amount of money a jury may award a plaintiff 
after the damages cap has been applied.142 While 47% of the studied 
cases were affected by Texas’s cap, it is estimated that a $500,000 cap 
would affect only 32% of verdicts.143 It is also estimated that North 
Carolina’s $500,000 cap would lead to a 29% reduction in the mean 
allowed verdict, compared to Texas’s 43% reduction.144 
B. Breakdown of Texas Data by Employment Status 
Further breakdown of the data into discrete plaintiff groups 
illustrates that plaintiffs who were employed experienced a much 
lower reduction in the aggregate allowed verdict than their 
unemployed counterparts. For example, the data were separated 
based on plaintiffs’ employment status to determine what effect the 
noneconomic damages cap would have on employed and unemployed 
plaintiffs.145 A study of 141 unemployed plaintiffs resulted in a 47% 
reduction in the aggregate allowed verdict.146 A study of 158 
 
 139. Hyman et al., supra note 130, at 362–63. 
 140. Id. at 382. 
 141. Id. at 378. 
 142. Id. at 405. A 38% reduction in allowed verdicts equates to a 27% reduction in 
actual payouts—the amount of money the plaintiff actually received from the defendant. 
This discrepancy arises becauase in many cases where plaintiffs prevail at trial, but do not 
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certain amount. This is largely because physicians often purchase insurance policies with 
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employed plaintiffs, however, resulted in only a 32% reduction in the 
aggregate allowed verdict.147 
Why is it that employed plaintiffs saw less of a reduction than 
their unemployed counterparts? Since economic damages include lost 
wages and unemployed plaintiffs are unable to recover lost wages, 
employed plaintiffs are far more valuable in states with limits on 
noneconomic damages. For example, someone who makes $1 million 
per year and misses a year of work due to medical malpractice would 
be entitled to these lost wages. In contrast, an unemployed plaintiff 
similarly injured did not lose any wages during that same span. This 
reality has created incentives for lawyers to accept high-earning 
plaintiffs as clients, rather than unemployed plaintiffs, due to the 
potential to obtain higher damages based on lost wages.148 “Critics [of 
the noneconomic damages cap] say it is increasingly preventing 
victims and their families from getting their day in court, especially 
low-income workers, children and the elderly.”149 
C. Breakdown of Texas Data by Age 
Employment status is not the only factor that may be affecting 
plaintiff selection, as significant differences also existed in the 
aggregate reduction of allowed verdicts in Texas between the elderly, 
non-elderly adults, and children. The elderly plaintiff class (ages 65+) 
experienced an aggregate reduction of 51% for allowed verdicts.150 
Adult non-elderly plaintiffs (ages 19–64) experienced a 37% decrease 
for allowed verdicts, while children (ages 2 months–18 years) 
experienced a 43% decrease.151 This discrepancy should come as no 
surprise after seeing the disparities between plaintiffs based on 
employment status. Adult non-elderly plaintiffs experienced the 
smallest decrease because these plaintiffs are the most likely to 
receive large awards for economic damages based on lost wages, 
considering they make up the majority of the workforce. The amount 
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of economic damages is not only limited to past lost wages but may 
also include a future lost earning potential. These numbers are easily 
quantifiable for plaintiffs who have salaries. The elderly, however, 
often are no longer working and do not plan on working in the future. 
Therefore, they cannot be awarded damages for any past or future 
lost wages.152 
Damages for children present a slightly different calculation 
problem than for the elderly. They are not currently working and 
therefore cannot receive damages for lost wages, so they may be less 
attractive clients for plaintiffs’ attorneys paid on a contingency basis. 
However, children may be able to receive economic damages for lost 
earning capacity, the amount of money the child would have been 
able to earn in the future but for the injury. While children may be 
able to obtain such an award, there are often issues in determining 
whether a jury award for lost earning capacity is too speculative when 
dealing with children. In Fox-Kirk v. Hannon,153 for example, a 
personal injury claim was brought on behalf of a two-year-old child.154 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a jury award of 
$1,675,000 to the child, holding that the plaintiff had presented 
sufficient evidence pertaining to the child’s mental and physical 
condition prior to her injury “to provide the jury with a reasonable 
basis upon which to estimate damages of [the child’s] lost earnings.”155 
The court reasoned that “[i]t is . . . recognized that some speculation 
is inherent in the projection of future earning capacity of a child or an 
adult.”156 
There are limitations in place, however, that may hinder a child’s 
ability to recover economic damages for lost earning capacity. In 
DiDonato v. Wortman,157 the Supreme Court of North Carolina found 
that a stillborn child was unable to recover any damages for economic 
harm, reasoning that “[w]hen a child is stillborn we can know nothing 
about its intelligence, abilities, interests and other factors relevant to 
the monetary contribution it might or might not—someday have 
 
 152. See Michael L. Rustad, Neglecting the Neglected: The Imact of Noneconomic 
Damage Caps on Meritorious Nursing Home Lawsuits, 14 ELDER L.J. 331, 335 (2007) 
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made to the beneficiaries in a wrongful death action.”158 The court 
explained that “[a] jury attempting to calculate an award for such 
damages would be reduced to ‘sheer speculation.’”159 Although it is 
possible in cases for some minors to receive economic damages in the 
form of lost earning capacity, the risk that such a calculation will be 
viewed by a court as “sheer speculation” serves as yet another 
disincentive for attorneys to take on such cases. 
Such speculation has led some to argue that children in 
malpractice cases are objectively worth far more alive than dead.160 
“For plaintiffs’ attorneys, the primary question in cases involving 
babies and others without income is whether medical needs are 
continuing.”161 An infant who sustains injuries in a negligent 
procedure may be able to receive economic damages for the cost of 
future, continuing medical care, including hospital expenses and any 
sort of therapy or care that may be needed.162 However, while a 
malpractice claim for an infant who dies may be able to receive 
damages for past medical expenses, such a plaintiff is unable to 
receive damages for any future medical expenses. “It has the effect of 
making an infant who is severely injured more valuable than those 
who don’t make it since families of children who die are limited to the 
cap.”163 
Such a situation can change the incentives of plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
leading to unfortunate results in states with damages caps for medical 
malpractice cases. For example, Virginia has a cap on all damages in 
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such cases.164 One Virginia mother explained that after her daughter 
sustained severe brain injuries when a C-section was not performed 
during childbirth, she decided to sue the physician through a 
Maryland law firm specializing in medical malpractice.165 One month 
later, however, the child died and the law firm dropped the case.166 
While the firm would not comment on its reason behind dropping the 
case, it is undisputable that the firm lost a major incentive to litigate 
this case after the death of the child, since economic damages in the 
form of future medical care could no longer be sought. While Virginia 
has a cap on total damages, not just noneconomic damages, North 
Carolina attorneys must still consider factors such as a plaintiff’s 
employment status and age in order to determine the total amount 
recoverable when deciding whether or not to accept such cases.167 
D. Summary of Statistical Comparison 
The negative impact of the damages cap in Texas allows for an 
estimate of the harm that could be done in North Carolina through 
the implementation of a damages cap. Although Texas has set its 
damages cap at half that of North Carolina’s cap—meaning that 
North Carolina’s cap may have less of an impact on allowed verdicts 
and payouts—the North Carolina cap will still limit the ability of 
plaintiffs to succeed in medical malpractice claims. The addition of a 
damages cap in North Carolina sets multiple hurdles in the path of 
plaintiffs. Since this cap effectively values certain groups of plaintiffs 
over others, it is now even harder for unemployed plaintiffs to find an 
attorney willing to take their case. Furthermore, even if these 
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plaintiffs do find an attorney willing to represent them, this cap may 
significantly reduce the amount plaintiffs can win even when their 
claims are successful. 
V.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGES CAPS 
The discriminatory effects of noneconomic damages caps have 
led some to argue that these caps violate the Equal Protection Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution.”168 While North Carolina courts have not yet 
ruled on the constitutionality of the noneconomic damages cap, such 
caps have been attacked under equal protection challenges in many 
other states.169 As of 2017, noneconomic damages caps have been 
challenged on equal protection grounds in sixteen states and survived 
in all but three.170 While state courts are not bound by the federal 
three-level system of equal protection review,171 state courts have 
most often rejected these challenges via rational basis review.172 For 
example, 
[i]n a decision that blended the federal and state claims 
together, the California Supreme Court held that the MICRA 
caps did not violate the plaintiff’s equal protection rights. The 
court concluded that there was no fundamental property right 
to collect an unlimited amount of tort damages, so rational-
basis review was the correct standard to apply. The Court held 
that the MICRA caps met this standard, noting that the 
legislature was responding to a medical malpractice insurance 
crisis and that it was “obvious” that a $250,000 noneconomic 
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damages cap was rationally related to the legitimate state 
interest of reducing the malpractice costs of providers and their 
insurers.173 
While other states generally have rejected equal protection 
challenges to noneconomic damages cap, whether North Carolina 
chooses to follow suit likely will depend on what level of scrutiny 
courts choose to apply to such a constitutional challenge in the 
future.174 Caps on noneconomic damages have also often been 
challenged on various other grounds, including separation of powers, 
access to courts, right to a jury trial, and due process violations.175 
These challenges on other grounds, however, have generally been 
rejected as well.176 Given the continued existence of these caps in the 
majority of states, it seems unlikely—though not impossible—that 
North Carolina courts will overturn these reforms any time soon. 
VI.  POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES 
Although North Carolina is unlikely to overturn these reforms in 
the near future, possible alternatives are available. The harm to 
vulnerable plaintiffs from the damages cap is very real. Simply 
increasing the North Carolina damages cap, however, is not a clear-
cut solution because setting a new damages cap would have two 
potentially conflicting goals: minimizing hardship both to physicians 
and patients. It is particularly difficult to determine at what amount a 
cap on noneconomic damages should be set to best meet these two 
potentially conflicting goals because doing so requires a normative 
rather than an empirical determination. Those who believe that 
defendant-physicians are still exposed to too much liability in North 
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Carolina may prefer a lower damages cap, such as those in place in 
Texas or California. Those who believe that such caps prevent 
plaintiffs from being made whole would argue that—if a cap had to 
exist at all—it should be much higher than the current North Carolina 
cap. 
Due to these challenges, North Carolina could look to 
alternatives other than capping damages awards. Florida and Virginia 
have, for example, enacted no-fault compensation schemes for birth-
related neurological injuries.177 While the topic of no-fault 
compensation schemes could be the subject of its own Comment, such 
schemes are briefly discussed as plausible alternatives both to North 
Carolina’s current damages cap and to a simple increase to the state’s 
current damages cap.  
As its name suggests, a no-fault compensation scheme differs 
from traditional tort law in that compensation is not dependent on 
whether the physician is legally at fault—i.e. acted negligently—but 
instead whether the physician caused the injury.178 Thus, no-fault 
schemes eliminate the requirement of proving negligence.179 Rather 
than only awarding compensation if a plaintiff can show that a 
physician acted negligently, these systems look to the other three 
prongs of a negligence actions—whether a duty existed between the 
parties, whether an injury occurred, and whether the injury was 
caused by the physician’s actions—and then look to whether the 
injury sustained fits within the statutory definition for compensable 
injuries.180  
There are certainly strong arguments in favor of such a system. 
Regardless of whether a physician is at fault for a patient’s injuries, 
the fact remains that the patient is injured. An approach that only 
provides compensation to patients who can prove negligence 
systematically overlooks patients who—despite their injuries—cannot 
prove negligence and thus receive nothing under a traditional tort 
system. 
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For example, Florida enacted the Birth-Related Neurological 
Injury Compensation Act in 1988.181 This program was specifically 
created to address the rising costs and shrinking availability of 
malpractice insurers in these states.182 Given the potential high cost of 
cases involving infants with birth-related neurological injuries, these 
programs were statutorily created to remove some of the most 
expensive cases from the state tort system and move them to an 
administrative no-fault system.183 Rather than submitting these claims 
in court, they are instead filed in a separate administrative proceeding 
with Florida’s Division of Administrative Hearings.184 
It should be noted that Florida’s no-fault compensation scheme 
does not solve the issues stemming from the existence of damages 
caps. In fact, Florida’s system caps pain and suffering awards at 
$100,000.185 However, “[m]ost parents of surviving, compensated 
infants receive the maximum amount, which may attract claimants [to 
pursue this remedy].”186 This system is in stark contrast to an ordinary 
medical malpractice claim system—the context in which damages 
caps operate—under which plaintiffs often receive nothing.187 Thus, 
systems such as Florida’s alter the risk/reward incentives present in 
ordinary malpractice claims. While plaintiffs would receive less 
money in a successful administrative proceeding in a no-fault 
compensation system, as compared to a successful trial verdict,188 
plaintiffs have a far greater chance of being awarded something.189 
Given that most parties who bring this claim receive the maximum 
$100,000 for pain and suffering, they are able to hedge their bets by 
increasing their chances of receiving at least something for their 
injuries.190 Furthermore, a claim petition under Florida’s no-fault 
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scheme costs just $15,191 while an ordinary medical malpractice claim 
may cost somewhere between $50,000 and $100,000.192 Thus, systems 
such as Florida’s may be attractive for prospective plaintiffs who 
suffered injuries yet may not be able to prevail at trial. 
The absence of a negligent party to pay a successful plaintiff begs 
the question of how such a scheme could be funded. Florida’s no-fault 
system is funded largely by obstetricians, who pay a $5,000 premium 
per year to partake in this system.193 Additionally, all other Florida 
physicians pay $250 per year, while nonpublic hospitals are typically 
required to pay $50 per live birth.194 Lastly, the state of Florida 
provided this program with a one-time grant of $40 million to fund 
the program.195 
No-fault compensation schemes have been established much 
more broadly in other countries. New Zealand, for example, 
abandoned its tort system in favor of a no-fault compensation system, 
“essentially barr[ing] medical malpractice litigation.”196 The New 
Zealand system is designed so that “claimants with similar disabilities 
receive similar compensation,” with entitlement awards falling into 
four categories: “treatment and rehabilitation,” “compensation for 
lost earnings,” “lump-sum compensation,” and “support for 
dependents.”197 While New Zealand’s no-fault system offers “more-
timely compensation to a greater number of injured patients,”198 it is 
certainly not a perfect system. Most notably, many view New 
Zealand’s no-fault system as providing inadequate recovery as 
compared to tort jurisdictions.199 Thus, this system seems to value 
providing recovery to as many parties as possible,200 while the 
American tort system seems to value maximizing recovery for 
plaintiffs who are able to bring successful claims.201 
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This Section is not to trying to suggest that no-fault 
compensation schemes are a perfect solution to the tort reform 
debate nationally or specifically in North Carolina. No-fault schemes 
have many inherent problems, particularly in regards to funding.202 
While the expansion of no-fault schemes in America may provide 
some low-income plaintiffs—who cannot find attorneys willing to 
take their cases—with opportunities to receive at least some form of 
monetary compensation, these awards may be negligible without 
proper funding. Thus, while the expansion of no-fault schemes may 
solve some issues in America’s current tort system, many new 
problems may also be generated. 
Both damages cap and no-fault compensation systems have 
advantages and disadvantages. Whether one prefers one or the other 
will likely depend on how one weighs the competing interests of 
defendant-physicians and plaintiff-patients. Because this answer 
depends on normative preferences about how to best compensate 
medical injuries, it is difficult to say if either system is “better” at 
handling such claims. However, it can be said that the popularity of 
New Zealand’s system, as well as the existence of narrow no-fault 
schemes in Florida and Virginia, indicate that North Carolina should 
at least consider no-fault compensation as a possible alteration to the 
current tort system. 
CONCLUSION 
North Carolina’s tort reform efforts are likely to have significant 
effects on plaintiffs at all stages of litigation. The strengthening of the 
pre-filing expert witness review requirement, by amending North 
Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 9(j), makes it more expensive and 
time consuming for plaintiffs to find experts able to testify in their 
cases. The strengthening of qualification requirements for expert 
witnesses makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to find witnesses who 
can be qualified as experts under the new Daubert standard. The 
increased burden of proof for emergency medical conditions means 
that plaintiffs will have to meet this higher burden of proof even for 
emergency medical conditions that occur outside of a hospital 
emergency room. Finally, when combined with the $500,000 liability 
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limit for noneconomic damages, plaintiffs who prevail at trial may see 
their jury awards greatly reduced. 
These changes have had the cumulative effect of decreasing the 
amount of medical malpractice cases filed for two main reasons. First, 
these increased procedural and evidentiary burdens may bar some 
claims that would have been viable under the preexisting law. Second, 
and perhaps most importantly, this damages cap has had the effect of 
preventing low-income plaintiffs with legitimate cases from ever 
getting their day in court, as attorneys must now assess the economic 
feasibility of cases based on the likelihood of receiving economic 
damages. While it is arguable that North Carolina’s $500,000 liability 
limit provides a better alternative than the $250,000 limit seen in 
other states, the truth of the matter is that any cap on noneconomic 
damages will have detrimental effects on low-income plaintiffs who 
cannot obtain as great an award as an equally injured plaintiff with 
more money. 
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